Actors choosing where to press their case – “groups choose venues by strategically assessing the institutional context which involves three primary elements: the group’s mix of resources, their opponent’s resource strengths, and the degree of venue accessibility, which is a combination of opponents degree of control over a venue and a venue’s image amiability or receptivity.” (Levy, 2016)
Ley, Aaron J.,2016. Vested Interests, Venue Shopping, and Policy Stability: The Long Road to Improving Air Quality in Oregon’s Willamette Valley (April 14, 2016)
Review of Policy Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2765230
Littoz-Monnet, A. (2014). The role of independent regulators in policy making: Venue-shopping and framing strategies in the EU regulation of old wives cures. European Journal of Political Research 53(1): 1–17.
“The car industry aimed to slow legislative progress. In the early 1960s, automakers ‘voluntarily’ installed PCV devices, arguing that regulation was not needed . Recurring framing strategies were that California was a special case and that the costs of pollution control technologies were substantial…. But when other states (New York, Philadelphia) began introducing pollution control laws, the industry changed its position and began arguing for federal standards: “When faced with the threat of inconsistent and increasingly rigorous state laws, they… [used] their superior organizational capacities in Washington to preempt or control the environmentalists’ legislative victories at the state level”  (p. 326).”
(Penna and Geels, 2012:1007-8)
(Quote is from E. Elliott, B. Ackerman, J. Millian, Toward a theory of statutory evolution: the federalization of environmental law, J. Law Econ. Organ. 1 (1985) 313–339.)