Turnbull, #climate and the National Press Club #auspol

On February 1st Malcolm Turnbull will make a major speech on the Coalition’s climate and energy policy at the National Press Club.In his last public utterance on the topic, at the Sydney fish market in December last year, he spilt coffee , perhaps trying to douse the flames caused by Josh Frydenberg’s declaration that carbon pricing would be considered in this year’s policy review. Turnbull ruled that out, so who knows what he  will say on Wednesday. One well-informed and immensely experienced observer reports that

“Turnbull will announce new vehicle emissions standards and a new energy efficiency scheme. He and his office are looking at “technological solutions” – bright new ideas in solar thermal, or battery or carbon storage technology that might fill the policy void. But all those technologies need government policies to provide investors with incentives and certainty, and without actually confronting the climate doubters no one can imagine what that policy might be.”

(Another similarly-credentialled observer says he is the weakest Prime Minister since Billy McMahon )Who knows, perhaps Turnbull will dust off the ‘Greenhouse Challenge‘ voluntary programme for industry that Prime Minister Paul Keating started and  John Howard extended. We will know soon enough.

Meanwhile, the National Press Club has a long and interesting (if you’re a pathetic geek like me) history with climate change, and it tells us something about Australian journalistic responses to climate change.

Clubbing together
The Press Club began life as a press luncheon club, the result of some journalists having an (uncharacteristic for the profession) drinks in a Canberra watering hole. It seeks “to provide a genuine national forum for discussion of the issues of the day by the personalities who help shape them.” (A cynic might say that it is a way for journalists to have stories handed to them literally on a plate, with some nice plonk alongside.) The first speaker, on 17 May 1963, was Chief Justice and External Affairs Minister Sir Garfield Barwick.  Soon after Barwick helped establish the Australian Conservation Foundation.  The Press Club initially only held a few events a year, but it has grown steadily and there are now about 70 a year. Early environmental speakers included conservationist Harry Butler (October 3 1979) and in mid 1984 the German Greens Petra Kelly  who you can hear here 

The Club, naturally, reflects the concerns of the day, and politicians of the day fly kites and announce policies.  The climate issue seems to have reached the Club in October 1988,when the Liberal Senator Chris Puplick, the Opposition’s Environment spokesperson  launched the Opposition’s environmental policy and spoke on past Coalition.  It seems bizarre now, but Puplick then  went on to develop a policy on climate change that was more ambitious than Labor’s and took it to the 1990 Federal election.

Puplick and his Labor opponent Graham Richardson debated at the Press Club on March 7, 1990, just before the Federal election, and it was from  the club that Bob Hawke made his final (and successful) appeal to green-minded voters, calling on  disaffected voters not to vote green but, if they did so, to direct their second preferences to Labour. He warned. “When you wake up on 25 March there won’t be a Democrat government or a green independent government.”

In June 1989,  the inaugural Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory,  Rosemary Follett,  had appeared at the club and said that she was

“particularly concerned with environmental issues of national and international significance. The people of the ACT can be assured that the government intends to act locally in addressing issues such as the Greenhouse Effect and Protection of the Ozone Layer.”

Richardson had appeared shortly afterwards,after two cancellations for lack of journalist interest.. He talked tough (it’s how the man rolls) on the Federal government perhaps using its constitutional powers to override state decisions on environmental matters. He also confirmed a report by Michelle Grattan about a Cabinet meeting at which Treasurer Paul Keating had vetoed his proposal for a 20 per cent reduction in Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2005 (the so-called ‘Toronto Target’ ). He told the assembled hacks

“… When I put this target to our Cabinet, I came under close questioning by the economic ministers. I couldn’t sustain my argument with sufficient science.

“I haven’t yet learnt how to lose gracefully so I was angry. I delved into the department’s records so that I could write to my Cabinet colleagues and demand a reconsideration. The cupboard, however was bare, and the letter was never written.”

[Dunn, R. 1989. Cabinet reduces greenhouse target. Australian Financial Review, 26 July.]

Sir Ninian Stephen, by then Australia’s first Environment Ambassador, spoke wittily in late 1990 on the topic of  “the environment: a passing storm or an issue for all seasons” (you can listen here –  He argued that it didn’t matter what he said, only if he blundered in the Q and A.

The following year the Canadian entrepreneur behind the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Maurice Strong, spoke. In November 1992, after Rio, Jeremy Leggett, a former geologist who had become  Greenpeace International’s Atmosphere and Energy Campaign leader spoke (his book The Carbon War is a terrific read, btw).

Worth remembering
Amid all the advocates of action (Ian Lowe, Peter Garrett, David Suzuki, Bob Brown, Gro Harlam Brundtland, Nick Stern), perhaps the one we should most remember is President Kinza Cloduma of Nauru.  In late 1997, when the Australian government’s diplomatic push for special treatment at the impending Kyoto Protocol meeting had silenced the South Pacific Forum’s attempt at a strong pro-action statement, Cloduma told the journalists

“I am not impressed when Mr. Howard openly scorns the critical nature of the situation in order to bow to the will of the fossil fuel industry.”

There have been peaks and troughs of concern since then, with scientists speaking  in September 2000 “Greenhouse Science Forum: How Real is Climate Change? What does Science Tell Us?”,  Ian Lowe spoke in 2005 on “ Is Nuclear Power Part of Australia’s Global Warming Solution?” (his answer was ‘nope’).

In the white-heat of the 2008-9 carbon pricing battles, Ross Garnaut seems to have had a camp-bed at the NPC, so often was he using it to launch various drafts of his climate reviews.  The Greens’ Christine Milne argued on 17 June 2009 that “The Climate nightmare is upon us.”  Bob Brown and  Ziggy Switowski debated nuclear versus renewables in April of the following year [thanks to the reader who alerted me to this!]

Less emphatically,  Penny Wong, Kevin Rudd, Greg Combet and Julia Gillard all used the NPC to launch various climate policy papers. In mid 2011, Gillard, under ferocious attack over her carbon proposal launched “The Government’s plan for a clean energy future”. She  was asked by Mark Riley about journalist famously suggesting that journalists ‘don’t write crap – it can’t be that hard.’

Since then the club has seen – among others –

Two way traffic
It hasn’t been one-way traffic. An early example of a sceptical perspective came in mid 1992 when Prof Richard Lindzen, Professor of Meteorology at  Massachusetts Institute of Technology spoke. (He had been brought out by the CSIRO atmospheric science division, which was then headed by G.B Tucker. Tucker had been aware of the issue in the mid-70s, and written an early monograph – The CO2-climate connection : a global problem from an Australian perspective–  in 1981, but in retirement wrote pieces for the Institute for Public Affairs with titles like  ‘The Greenhouse Panic’. But I digress)

Three years later the Club heard from  Dr Patrick  Moore who was billed as a “ Canadian Environmentalist and one of the founders of Greenpeace”.The first term can be debated. The second cannot.

Climate change exploded as a public policy issue in Australia in late 2006.   It’s ironic to remember now, but when John Howard’s hand-picked emissions taskforce suggested that a low tax on carbon emissions — less than $5 per tonne –  might give Australia a start in preparing for an eventual global emissions trading system , the  Minerals Council of Australia chief executive Mitchell Hooke argued at the press club that while Australia should not embark on unilateral action, there was scope for “unilateral leadership”. He said

“I don’t want a blunt economic instrument of a carbon tax [but] I would see that kind of low order price as being part of a cap and trade framework.”

Hooke hardened his line, of course, as time went on.  At the peak of the 2011 carbon pricing battles, in June, the Australian Coal Association’s Ralph Hillman spoke on “The mining industry’s position on the carbon tax.”

The same month,  Lord Monckton  and the Australia Institute’s Richard Denniss squared off in a debate. Two weeks later  former President Vaclav Klaus President of the Czech Republic  spoke on “Climate Change: A new ideology”

Bjorn Lomborg followed up his October 2003  visit with another ten years later in December 2013.  Now that he won’t be having his ‘consensus centre’ , the trend suggests it might be another 6 years before he appears again.

Journalism and climate change
The Press Club’s willingness to host those who deny basic scientific facts is indicative of a broader difficulty that journalism has had with this issue.  Academic studies of the journalism profession’s dilemma over climate change. One influential paper argues that “balance is bias”, given the overwhelming scientific argument (and dare we say ‘consensus’) on anthropogenic climate change. The authors argue that

“the prestige press’s adherence to balance actually leads to biased coverage of both anthropogenic contributions to global warming and resultant action.”

John Oliver put it more visually with this stunt on ‘Last Week Tonight’

Australia’s experience has been extensively studied – see here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here. For starters.

All this is part of a battle for hearts and minds – what counts as ‘common sense’ and shapes or sustains the institutions  – “stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior” – underpinning society.

Recently scientists have been admitting that studying climate change exacts an emotional toll. Journalists are following suit.

Malcolm Turnbull first addressed the club on March 18 1992, wearing his Australian Republican Movement hat.  He might need better head-wear this time round.  When Kevin Rudd launched the White Paper of his ill-fated and unloved Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme three protesters were dragged out The numbers of protesters there to greet him on February 1st will probably fall closer to that than the 1500 who turned up to say g’day to Pauline Hanson in 1997

But on the day, and indeed all through the year, Turnbull will – like other endangered Australian fauna – be feeling the heat.

Narrative, schmarratives – on telling plausible stories

So, getting to the pointy end of this PhD thesis.  Reading too much and writing too little (but the balance is shifting in the right direction). Stumbling on methodology stuff that makes things clearer (or less murky).  These are from

Geels, F. and Schot, J. 2010. The Dynamics of Transitions: A Socio-technical perspective. in Grin, J. Rotmans and Schot (in collaboration with Geels F. and Loorbach, D.). Transitions to Sustainable Development New Directions in the Study of Long Term Transformative Change. New York: Routledge.

Firstly,

To advise people to write “narratives” is really to advise nothing. For narratives can be structured in many, many ways. It takes powerful investigative (and justificatory) methods, as well as a rich array of ever-refined theoretical ideas to figure out what “structures” and “conjunctures” count, and which happenings are transformative as opposed to merely humdrum.
(Skocpol, 1994: 332)

and then

These local narrative explanations should explicate: a) How is the game structured? Who are the most important players? What are their cognitive frames, interests, resources? b) What options and possibilities do actors have? Which actions are chosen and why? How do they react to each other? c) What are the broader effects of actions? d) Are structural changes accepted and institutionalized?
(Geels and Schot 2010)

and finally

To that end, George and Bennett (2004: 210–212) distinguish four progressive steps: 1) Detailed narrative (case history) presented in the form of a chronicle. Such a narrative is specific and makes no explicit use of theory. 2) Use of hypotheses and theoretical mechanisms to explain parts of the narrative. 3) Analytic explanation: a historical narrative of a specific case is converted into an analytical explanation by identifying an overall pattern that is couched in explicit theoretical forms. 4) More general explanation about the phenomena of which the case is a case: the particular case study is used to develop theoretical arguments about a general phenomenon.
(Geels and Schot 2010)

George and Bennett? This.

The Institutional Void – or abyss?

Hajer, M. 2003. Policy without polity? Policy analysis and the institutional void. Policy Sciences, , Vol.36(2), pp.175-195.
Abstract. How should policy analysis respond to the changing context of policy making? This article examines three aspects of policy analysis in this changing context: polity, knowledge and intervention. It argues that policy making now often takes place in an ‘institutional void’ where there are no generally accepted rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon….

Rules? What rules?  Along with the political amnesia that Laura Tingle documents so well (as do other people), our societies have become ‘ungovernable,’ at least by public actors…  Hence the turn to ‘governance’ – as a blame-spreading exercise…

What was that Freddie Nietzsche said about being careful when looking into the abyss?

Better wear shades.

No, these ones.

The costs of collusion with activist bullshit and hype cycles

When a Shiny New Technology is being hyped, it’s in order to pump the stock up, or get venture capital.

hypecycle

That’s how the hype cycle game is played, and it happens among mostly consenting adults. Fair enough you might say. No hype and nothing gets done (maybe).
But when it comes to social movement hype cycles, the rules of the game should be different. We who know better (old farts, or well-read, or generally cynical) should not be enabling the bullshit artists, the naive or the self-aggrandizing sociopaths who promote themselves and their projects as the Next Big and Transformative Thing.

Why?  Because all that happens in a technological hype cycle is that some investors lose money, everyone dusts themselves off, picks themselves off and the game goes on.

But we have an emergency right now, [yes, it has always been an emergency somewhere – for any civilisation or other species that was coming into contact with whitey in the last 500 years for example- now it is planet-wide].  And that means that social movements cannot afford to lose 80 or 90% of their potential recruits in the aftermath of stupidly hyped events/’projects’ which lead to  the dashing of (unrealistic) expectations. The clocks are ticking, and we really really don’t have time for a new generation of potential activists to grow up, or for the burnt-out ones to lick their wounds and forget enough of the last hype cycle to get cautiously involved in the next one.

After a hype cycle people become more cynical, less available for a decent group/project.

And the cynicism ramifies and extends further, to their friends and friends of friends.

We cannot afford this.  We have to call bullshit.  We can’t just say ‘that’s how life works’.

Because it’s not us – comfortable middle-class Westerners with water coming out of our taps and electricity coming out of our sockets, with something vaguely approaching the rule of law and freedom of speech who will suffer in the next twenty years.*  We have a very slender opportunity to create the psychological/social infrastructure for SOME sort of tolerable ‘civilized’ life for some of our species and perhaps reduce the apocalypse of the Sixth Great Extinction.  But that slender opportunity only exists if we refuse to collude in the propagation of shite.

 

* After that, of course, all bets are off.

BRILLIANT paper on sustainability transitions and political ecology. #holycrap #jealous

And the Best Paper I Have Read This Month Award goes to… drum-roll please…

Lawhon, M. and Murphy, J. 2011. Socio-technical regimes and sustainability transitions: Insights from political ecology. Progress in Human Geography. Vol. 36 (3), pp.354-378.

Here is the abstract

Sustainability is increasingly becoming a core focus of geography, linking subfields such as urban, economic, and political ecology, yet strategies for achieving this goal remain illusive [sic!]. Socio-technical transition theorists have made important contributions to our knowledge of the challenges and possibilities for achieving more sustainable societies, but this body of work generally lacks consideration of the influences of geography and power relations as forces shaping sustainability initiatives in practice. This paper assesses the significance for geographers interested in understanding the space, time, and scalar characteristics of sustainable development of one major strand of socio-technical transition theory, the multi-level perspective on socio-technical regime transitions. We describe the socio-technical transition approach, identify four major limitations facing it, show how insights from geographers – particularly political ecologists – can help address these challenges, and briefly examine a case study (GMO and food production) showing how a refined transition framework can improve our understanding of the social, political, and spatial dynamics that shape the prospects for more just and environmentally sustainable forms of development.

Why is it so good?   Very clearly written, very clearly argued, and the authors have read heaps of important literature and synthesised it beautifully.  There is so much here for academics, but also for activists who want to loot the ivory tower.  I can’t quote too much, but these bits, from an activist perspective are useful (I read it with my Write Your Bloody Thesis Hat on, the hat I will be wearing from now until it is done, or the Donald starts a thermonuclear war based on a stray tweet.)

Once the lens is extended to include diverse actors, questions will arise regarding the roles played and the kinds of interactions between them. How and why were different stakeholders approached, informed about, and enrolled into the transition management process? What kind of language was used in these processes? Are participants made to feel that their opinions are valued and considered in decision-making?
When considering these kinds of questions, Whatmore (2009) argues for the development of competency groups as a means to more pluralistically and fairly develop interventions in response to social or environmental problems while still keeping focused and including relevant, affected actors
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2011: 366)

and

As Allen (1997) has shown, power can be conceptualized in a variety of ways – as an ‘inscribed capacity’, a collectively produced resource mobilized by groups to achieve particular ends, or as a mobile and diffuse phenomenon realized as a series of ‘strategies, techniques, and practices’.
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2011: 367)

and

Power may be expressed directly – in terms of who controls the selection of participants in decision-making processes, who participates, and whose voices count in the making of decisions – or indirectly – in terms of the language used to convince others to support a position or to create discursive alliances (Birkenholtz, 2009).
Many political ecologists emphasize the relational nature of power, arguing that power is found not in elite individuals as suggested by socio-technical transition theory but instead in relationships.
(Lawhon and Murphy, 2011: 367)

But activists won’t get away from the smugosphere, the emotathons, and will keep losing, and keep burning through potential recruits, who – after being used as ego-fodder a couple of times – give up and stay home.

In terms of the politics of sustainability socio-technical transitions (my Thesis) it is insanely useful.  I’ll stop gushing now – gotta read a few 2016 papers (Avelino et al x 2)

Here’s the references that look particularly mouth-watering to me, fwiw.. (no offence intended to the others)

References

Allen J (1997) Economies of power and space. In: Lee R and Wills J (eds) Geographies of Economies. London: Arnold, 59–70.

Allen J (2003) Lost Geographies of Power. Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell.

Angel DP and Rock MT (2003) Engaging economic development agencies in environmental protection: The case for embedded autonomy. Local Environment 8: 45–59.

Avelino F and Rotmans J (2009) Power in transition: An interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural change. European Journal of Social Theory 12: 543–569.

Bailey I and Wilson GA (2009) Theorising transitional pathways in response to climate change: Technocentrism, ecocentrism and the carbon economy. Environment and Planning A 41: 2324–2341.

Berkhout F, Smith A, and Stirling A (2004) Sociotechnological regimes and transition contexts. In:

Elzen B, Geels FW, and Green K (eds) System Innovation and the Transition to Sustainability. Cheltenham: EdwardElgar, 48–75.

Blaikie P (1985) The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries. Harlow: Longman.

Castree N (2005) Nature: The Adventures of a Concept. Abingdon: Routledge.

Ekers M and Loftus A (2008) The power of water: Developing dialogues between Gramsci and Foucault. Environment and Planning D 26: 698–719.

Freeman C (1991) Innovation, changes of techno-economic paradigm and biological analogies in economics. Revue Economique 42: 211–231.

GandyM (2002) Concrete and Clay: Reworking Nature in New York City. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Geels FW (2006) The hygienic transition from cesspools to sewer systems (1840–1930): The dynamics of regime transformation. Research Policy 35: 1069–1082.

Hodson M and Marvin S (2010) Can cities shape socio-technical transitions and how would we know if they were? Research Policy 39: 477–485.

Kemp R, Schot J, and Hoogma R (1998) Regime shifts to sustainability through processes of niche formation: The approach of strategic niche management. Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 10: 175–195.

McManus P and Gibbs D (2008) Industrial ecosystems? The use of tropes in the literature of industrial ecology and eco-industrial parks. Progress in Human Geography 32: 525–40.

Mann G (2009) Should political ecology be Marxist? A case for Gramsci’s historical materialism. Geoforum 40(3): 335–344.

Markard J and Truffer B (2008) Technological innovation systems and the multi-level perspective: Towards an integrated framework. Research Policy 37: 596–615.

Meadowcroft J (2005) Environmental political economy, technological transitions and the state. New Political Economy 10: 479–498.

Meadowcroft J (2009) What about the politics? Sustainable development, transition management, and long term energy transitions. Policy Science 42: 323–340.

Patil AC (2009) Transition to clean coal technologies in India. Computer Aided Chemical Engineering 27: 1731–1736.

Robbins P and Bishop K (2008) There and back again: Epiphany, disillusionment, and rediscovery in political ecology. Geoforum 39: 747–755.

Rocheleau D (2008) Political ecology in the key of policy: From chains of explanation to webs of relation. Geoforum 39: 716–727.

Rotmans J, Kemp R, and van AsseltM(2001) More evolution than revolution: Transition management in public policy. Foresight – The Journal of Future Studies, Strategic Thinking and Policy 3: 15–31.

Scott J (1999) Seeing Like a State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Smith A, Voß JP, and Grin J (2010) Innovation studies and sustainability transitions: The allure of the multi-level perspective and its challenges. Research Policy 39: 435–448.

 

Me and your research

I don’t get many requests to take part in research, but the rate seems to be increasing, and the to-and-fro takes up everyone’s bandwidth. Therefore this;

Dear Xx/Xy/prefer not to say,

I am flattered by your request to take part in your research. My decision always leans to ‘no’ because of a) time constraints and b) your research focus [see below], but it’s only a lean. It all depends on your answers to the following questions.

Deal-breakers (and therefore if the answer to these is ‘no’, then we can both save time and move on.)

  1. Are you willing and able to make a recording of this interview in a format that makes sense (i.e. MP3, not some obscure proprietary software) and provide it to me.

  2. Are you willing to provide a typed transcript of my interview within 30 days of it being recorded.

  3. What are your supervisors’ contact details. Just in case you promise 1 and 2 and then don’t deliver, I will contact them.

  4. And, the biggest deal breaker of them all:

    What is your detailed plan for making your work available and accessible to activists in “the movement” (not that it actually exists in any meaningful sense) ? Please note, if the sum total of your plan is sticking a copy of your article – probably written in academese- on some obscure website or academia.edu, then that  will not impress me much (at all). Activists are busy and few are trained in decoding jargon and wading through the passive voice treacle demanded of early career researchers. So what is your plan? If you’ve done a ‘here’s the version for activists’ thing before, send me that. If you haven’t, well, everyone has to start somewhere, don’t they?

Less deal-breaker-y

5.  Why haven’t you chosen to study the rich, as per this quote? Please read this short story before continuing
6. How long is this going to take (not a deal-breaker, probably)
7. The quality of your questions. Don’t be banal. Don’t bore me. Don’t try to box me in with assumptions – I will challenge them
8. Are you offering anonymity (I’m probaby not that bothered by this)

By now you would be a bit weird if you were not thinking  ‘screw this arrogant prick‘. That’s fine. If you still want to know what I think about issue x, you can do a keyword search on either manchesterclimatemonthly.net or marchudson.net. It’s probably quicker and less irritating than interviewing me anyways.

Afterwards

  • you will send me a copy of your completed work
  • you will alert me to the publication of your work in any journals/use of material on websites/blogs etc.
  • Remember, I have your supervisors’ details…

After all this, you might answer ‘satisfactorily’ to all the above and I still say no because a) I’m too busy b) my spider senses are tingly.

Contact me if you want.

Babies, bathwater, innovation and Gramsci…

The Manchester Institute of Innovation Research (a mouthful, I know) runs internal seminars where academics get to test out new ideas/reboot old ones and generally reflect on the direction(lessness) of travel for innovation policy, science and technology policy and much else. It can be dreadful, but when it works – and it did yesterday – it is great fun and a learning opportunity with few if any equals.

Yesterday’s seminar, the first for the year, was entitled

Innovation policy at stake: should we throw the baby out with the bath water

It was delivered by Prof Philippe Laredo. The blurb went thus-

Very harsh questions emerge here and there on our cumulative knowledge on research and innovation policies. Put together they drive to ask whether we should throw the baby with the bath waters, now that the term is all over the place.

My take on this debate can be summed up around 4 main questions

  • The first is both historical and evaluative: there has not been much discussion about the gathering in one policy of ‘science’ and ‘innovation’ policies. Is it still useful? Has it ever been productive as a sectoral policy? Should not we rather consider another grouping focused on capability building regrouping higher education and (academic) research?

  • The second requires to delve again into history and the birth of S&T policies, which were mostly warranted by ‘mission oriented’ objectives. What has changed when discussing ‘societal’ challenges?

  • The third question, probably the most problematic for us in management, deals with the underlying assumptions (linked to manufacturing industries) on which the portfolios and policy mixes for innovation policies are based. Can we go on, facing politicians, keep telling the same stories on portfolios of instruments and policy mixes?

  • And the last one, I face more and more, who is this policymaker? Is not it too easy an answer to say that all is co-created or that governance is the answer?

I am not going to try to capture all that was said – and I may have got some things wrong, in which case I will correct them when told. This is mostly just bullet points of what was said, and the Q and A, with some [additional comments in square brackets]. Its purpose? Mostly as an aide-memoire for me, so After The Thesis Is Written I can come back and plug some gaps in my innovation theory knowledge.

Presentation

Laredo: We need to think of science policy and innovation policy separately, and especially research and innovation policy.
Should we focus on sustainability? On what is left of previous policies?
Johan Schot paper from 2015 points to 90% of policies not working. [This one perhaps?]
Policy makers are pretty unsatisfied with academic output. We seem stuck in the manufacturing paradigm – from the 1980s onwards, same recommendations (Laredo read over 70 papers, all with pretty much interchangeable recommendations – see Q and A for more on this.)

Why do we stick to old paradigms, defend failed policies? [Mental inertia? Nobody ever got fired for buying IBM, or citing Rogers.]

Laredo says four phases of innovation policy
1. collective industrial research
2.  early 80s, collaborative programs, university/industry
3. Support SMEs innovation (directly, tax credits)
4. Support the ‘start-up’ ecology.

Of course most policies a combination of these four [Cohen’s Garbage Can model from 1972, bricolage, palimpsests]

Btw, the tax credit loss to state revenues is ENORMOUS – $100bn a year, (EU and USA combined).

Look up: SPRU stuff on ‘Hidden Innovation

Remember, growing concentration of industries (i.e. fewer players, very dominant firms) means that “competition policy” doesn’t fit reality [Thomas Kuhn would be laughing]

There’s a changed relationship between producers and consumers [“Prosumers” etc]

60% of investment going into circulation of products and interactions with users, rather than ‘basic’ R and D.

Shifting role of users in driving innovation – crowd sourcing, political consumption, social innovation, sharing economy, changes in ownership/consumption patterns. Put all of these marginal things together and you have a MAJOR change in the socio-economic articulation. But we’re not studying it…(well enough)

Innovation is coming from the regions, not from the nation states. Politicians (regional), seeking re-election are asking the questions from the outside. Laredo laments ‘I have nothing to tell them’. They say to him ‘well, these conferences with 100s of experts – what do they actually achieve.’ Laredo read lots of reports and then had to agree with them. He says ‘our policy agenda [i.e. what and how innovation scholars study] should change deeply.’

There has been failure at the national level, government and bureaucratic.

[Laura Tingle, in her Quarterly Essay Political Amnesia, deals precisely with this in the country that is the setting for my case-study- Australia. The capacity to remember, let alone act, of the Federal state has been dramatically eroded over the last 20 years.]

They wash their hands of it by sub-contracting it out.

Public banks are becoming major/core actors in innovation funding, but barely studied at all (Laredo says he found three papers on it in last five years).

Innovation policy is not [illegible! In synch with?] science and tech policy.

Q and A

I am going to invoke the Chatham House rule for three reasons – simplicity (self-explanatory), politics – people there were asking questions in a way that they didn’t think would be reported for ‘everyone’ [going by this blog’s normal hit rate, about 5 people] to read forever – and accuracy – if I got stuff wrong, it should appear as a misrepresentation. And I got stuff wrong.

Q. You imply there’s a lot of bathwater and very little baby.
A. Yes, sort of, and remember, the academics didn’t invent some of the constructs we use, they came from policy experiments in the real world.

Q. Most R and D is about D (development). What keeps Science Technology and Innovation together, why don’t they break up – because science needs innovation to justify its budget. Think of it as a marriage. So, if a divorce, how would we develop useful innovation policy?
A: how did they merge, look at discursive, governmental and administrative levels. Look at Vannevar Bush onwards, and in the 1963 report [don’t know which] there was no mention of science, only strategic areas for government.

[Someone who knows (a helluvalot) about these things pointed me to this paper –
THE UNITY OF SCIENCE—TECHNOLOGY byMELVIN KRANZBERG American Scientist Vol. 55, No. 1 (MARCH 1967), pp. 48-66]

Q UK Science policy became substitute for technology policy because in the late 70s/early 80s it became impossible to talk about ‘intervention’/industrial policy.
A. For employment we need incremental innovation over and above ‘breakthrough’ innovation.
We have no policy instruments for dealing with the three transformations. Things are analogous to where agriculture/manufacturing was in France in 1965. Agriculture was the major employer, so if basing report on employment would have looked at agriculture.

[Gramsci – The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.

[Machiavelli-
“It ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them.”

Q Who is the policy maker? How do you find them? And what is with this quantitative R and D funding obsession?
A – Second question first – In 1963 only one OECD country had a minister of science. By 1968 all but the USA had one. And there were gazillions of statisticians under them, measuring inputs (because you can do that easily) – Fraschetti manual” (sp?).

[Anecdote of the cop who finds a drunken man crawling around on hands and knees under lamp-post.
Cop – what are you doing?
Drunk – looking for my keys.
Cop – did you lose them here
Drunk – no, I lost them over there in the alley where it is dark
Cop – then why are you looking here?
Drunk – the light’s better.

As for policy makers – fascinating to see the loss of substantive competence in all governments. Fewer people around, less experience. So therefore they go through procedural processes because they don’t actually understand the issues, and then they delegate to actors [This has been PRECISELY my experience trying to get Manchester City Council to act on climate change].

Q – there are some books – The Innovation Illusion [by Erixon and Weigel]  that argue that there has been, outside of ICT, a slow down in innovation, and fewer new entrants because the incumbents have figured out how to rig the game in their own favour. See also THE Corruption of Capitalism – rentier capitalism, a few big firms/oligopolies. They get tax credits in the billions. So, big firms benefiting, getting R and D funding from tax payer for stuff that they’d do anyway, and using power to suppress [competence-destroying] innovation.
A – You can go back to the 1920s – Keynes and Kondratieff arguing that progress is slowing down. Progress is in a few areas that have a deep impact that transforms the rest of the economy [William Gibson – the future is here, it’s just unevenly distributed]. So for example, electrification does this, or railways – Alfred Chandler’s book The Visible Hand.

Articulation between breakthrough disruption in areas that then transform the economic fabric. So progress not disappearing, just in specific bits.

Q – Robert J Gordon on quantifying ICT sector

Q – But is ICT same as steel? And do those numbers include robotics and Artificial Intelligence

Q – He doesn’t use data on things that haven’t happened yet.

Laredo – innovation policy in 1970s and 80s was ‘how can this new gizmo be generalised. Now it’s about the generalisation [sp?] of ongoing stuff mostly, and breakthroughs a second focus.

Q – What earlier questioner said is right – the role of powerful actors and powerful non-state actors is actually very important

Suzanna Aborra Capable actors. [Need to check this]

Q – maybe we need to look at Trump – he will definitely be shaking things up. Tweets as a way of creating scandal, forcing otherwise more powerful actors to change [I think this references Ford’s decision not to continue building cars in Mexico]

Q – need to look at market power to suppress competitors, look at specific sectors.

Q – around competition policy, market creation, we [innovation scholars] have missed a trick.

Reference – Innovation Paradox

Verdict: Wow. Normally, I dislike Q and As where it’s mostly the Big Beasts doing the talking . At a conference it can be especially tedious – people showing off to mark their turf, impress/intimidate their frenemies at other institutions. There was none of that in this though – these are people who know each other well, have regular interactions and – crucially – were engaging very thoughtfully indeed on the basis of – if you add it up – hundreds of years of thinking and writing about innovation.  Starts the MIOIR seminar series off with a bang.