Category Archives: our doomedness

#Awalkinthepark – climate denialism, “sticky v path contingent” historical discursive institutionalism and comparative institutionalisms

So, read Weart in bed and Bell/Schmidt as I walked around the park with the 50lb backpack

  • Weart, S. 2011. Global warming: How skepticism became denial. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol.67(1), pp.41-50.
  • Bell, S. 2012. Where are the Institutions? The Limits of Vivien Schmidt’s Constructivism. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 42, pp.714-719.
  • Schmidt, V. 2014. Comparative Institutionalisms. In Telo, M (ed). 2014. Globalisation, Multilateralism, Europe:Towards a Better Global Governance.  Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 109-123.

Weart is the guy who literally wrote the book on the “Discovery of Global Warming” and has generously put together an even more extensive website that is super-useful.  He interviewed some of the key people who are now dead (e.g. Gordon MacDonald).    He makes the very valid point that there was enormous scepticism about the impact of increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide that were only really resolved (sic) with the ice core data from 1980 onwards .  He’s good on the demise (contested) of the ‘saturation’ argument about co2 (p.43), the rise of organised denial (I’m looking at you, George C. Marshall Institute, Global Climate Coalition, Competitive Enterprise Institute and the personal attacks (especially Ben Santer back in ‘96, but he could have mentioned many others, e.g. Michael Mann).

One very odd factual error – climategate was (late) 2009, not 2010 (p.48)

Overall – excellent brief summary of the last 100 or so years.  For bells, whistles and anecdotes, see Joshua Howe’s 2014 ‘Behind the Curve’.

So, Stephen Bell wrote a response to Vivien Schmidt’s response to his critique of her article. This I did not know until yesterday afternoon.  (See yesterday’s post for details on discursive institutionalism).

Bell makes a serious and cogent defence of his preferred kind of historical institutionalism, one that is not ‘sticky’ (i.e. over-emphatic on the notion of path-dependence, and actors being trapped in steel (iron?) cages). He’s particularly keen on  Streeck, W. and Thelen, K. 2005.  Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies.  Oxford: Oxford University Press.

He also writes

“as far back as 1992, Steinmo and Thelen were emphasizing the role of strategic actors in shaping and being shaped by institutions, as I point out in detail in my article.”
(Bell, 2012: 715)

The citation is

Sven Steinmo and Kathleen Thelen, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective’, in Kathleen Thelen, Sven Steinmo and Frank Longstreth, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

He disagrees with Schmidt on the enabling/constraining question-

Although seeing it as ‘intuitively appealing’, Schmidt also questions my argument that institutions can have both constraining and enabling effects. ‘For Bell, institutions constrain, until they don’t, when they become resources’.18 This is not my position. I simply argue that institutions can have constraining and enabling effects on agents. This view is now commonplace in many institutional accounts.19 I can think of many ways the School I work in has such effects. Schmidt seems to think that if institutions provide agents with resources, then ‘their institutional effect, their ability to structure behaviour, falls away’.20 But why? Surely institutions can have constraining and enabling effects, limiting some forms of agency and enhancing other forms, in a contingent manner.
(Bell, 2012: 716)

Ultimately he rejects a contest between constructivist and institutionalist analysis –

“The flexible HI approach I elaborate begins its analytical investigation with agents and works outwards to explore how agents interact with institutions. Discursive analysis is very important in how we understand the ideational drivers of agent’s behaviour. But there is no need to draw a distinction between discursive analysis and the kind of HI analysis I advocate. This was the whole point of my article, to show how constructivist insights can help build rounded accounts of agency within institutional settings. Certainly, ideas matter, but so does the way in which interpretive agents interact with institutions. The aim is to theorize and to illustrate empirically the mutual shaping of agents and institutions over time and how this shapes change processes.”
(Bell, 2012: 718)

Bell reckons

“It may be possible under extraordinary (say revolutionary) conditions for agents collectively to overturn or deny institutions, but, more ordinarily, institutions confront agents in the here and now as embedded, already structured terrains. Institutions are thus ontologically prior to the individuals who populate them at any given time. This is what gives institutions causal properties and why at the bottom we pursue ‘institutional’ analysis. The same logic applies the analysis of structures. Yet, on Schmidt’s reading, if we are to reduce institutions to ideas, does not the same apply to structures? The implication here is that we redefine a major structural shift, such as Australia’s changing terms of trade in the 1990s, as simply ideational. True, such events are always subject to interpretation by agents, but to wholly collapse such events into the realm of the ideational goes too far in my view.
(Bell, 2012: 718-9)

He’s at pains to say that the approach he advocates

“does not give primacy to agents, institutions, structures or ideas, but instead holds each to be mutually constitutive in a dialectical manner. Agents, as Archer puts it, thus confront institutions and structures as a ‘distinct strata of reality’,30 which must be dealt with in the here and now and perhaps changed over time. In other words, institutions are more than just real-time ideational artefacts.”
(Bell, 2012: 719)

Archer is this –  Archer, M. 2003.  Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Further concepts to look up
Hay’s ideational crisis construction
Hay’s Ideational path dependency
The difference between institutions and structures.  Dowding may help –
Dowding, K. 2008. Agency and Structure: Interpreting Power Relations. Journal of Power, Vol. 1, pp.21–36.

After my thesis I may have time for this
Hattam, V. 1993.  Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

So, chapter 5 of . Globalisation, Multilateralism, Europe:Towards a Better Global Governance is by Vivien Schmidt, and it is a SUPER useful overview of comparative institutionalisms.

She gives really clear explanations of old institutionalisms, the behaviourist/reductionist turn [BF Skinner and his bloody pigeons], and the response(s) to that around rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological (normative) institutionalism. Each gets an extended section, before she turns to her clear favourite, discursive institutionalism.

She compares and contrasts the origins, strengths, weaknesses, overlaps and incompatibilities between the four types very well indeed (to me – I am no expert).
There’s a load of suggested and suggestive reading. This would be an excellent primer for thickies (like me).  A quibble would be that she is possibly unfair to the historical institutionalists (see Bell’s critique above, which she does not mention), in distinguishing between the sticky and path-contingent types (the latter allowing agents more, um, agency).
There DOES however, seem to be a tacit peace treaty feeler in her closing statement

“Rather, here we suggest that one use whichever mix of institutionalisms is appropriate in seeking to explain a particular theoretical or substantive issue. As such, it involves recognising that although different institutionalisms may be complementary in any such study, they do have different sets of philosophical assumptions embedded in their very methodologies. Awareness of the differences is essential, and it means that a pairing or sequencing of institutionalist approaches may work better for building a substantive theoretical argument on any given theme in comparative politics or international relations…. Certainly, if one is interested in explaining the dynamics of change (and continuity), then one might start, rather than finish, with a discursive institutionalist analysis.”
(Schmidt, 2014: 122)

Which means that my hope for a simple plug-and-play model where I could be lazy and just cherry pick facts to ‘prove’ my case is dashed. Bugger.

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Psycho-analysing the species – on the 20th Century & pre-tits-up 21st…

Hmmm,
I am dubious about the value of trying to psycho-analyze societies. And when I say “we” and “the species” I am v. conscious of mostly meaning white middle-class male Westerners.

But still, maybe this will provoke someone into sending me some very good reading suggestions.

ATT (After the Thesis) I am going to read “Male Fantasies” by Klaus Theweleit.,,,
What else should I read?

“The responsibility of intellectuals” Or “After I get shot in the head”

Some guy, I forget who, said that it was the responsibility of intellectuals to expose lies and tell the truth.  Meh, as far as it goes, sure. Which truths to who gets more interesting….

If I get shot in the head (and given my deteriorating relationship with Manchester City Council, this is not impossible), and there is a memorial lecture (rather than the more likely party where Councillors and activists get on down), then this;
I don’t want the speaker just to tell everyone what they already (should) know, or could find out from reading a book/article.

I want to the speaker to earn their keep, and use their analytic skills to tell truths about ‘the movement’ to ‘the movement’.

  • Are we losing? Why?  How do we stop losing?
  • Are we winning? Why?  Can we keep winning? (What are the next moves of our opponents, and what might we do about those). Can we ‘win’ quicker? How?
  • What are our metrics for winning and losing, anyhow?
  • What do we here in this room need to do, here in this city, in the next three weeks, three months, six months?
  • How will we know if we’re doing these things?
    How will we know if they are ‘enough’?
  • What can we learn from our own failures and successes?
  • What can we learn from comparable movements’ failures and successes?
  • What does it mean to learn, anyway?
  • Under what conditions, with what tools, do we learn?
  • Can we improve how easily/quickly we learn? How?

 

The whole ‘not my place to tell movement what to do’ schtick, that just about passed muster up to the 80s is not good enough anymore,  imho.  The trades unions, churches, solidarity campaigns etc are on their asses.  Too much sage on the stage, too much wilful ego-fodderfication, too many zombie repertoires, too much smugosphere.

Here comes the “2050” bullshit. Be happy for it. #climate

The future is here, and we are avoiding it.
2020 used to be the target year, by which we had done x and y and z.
Sadly, we didn’t do those things. A mix of complacency, distraction, stupidity and incompetence mostly explains that. So it goes.

But this presents the happy shiny people (HSP) who want to pretend that they’re making the world a better place with a problem. If they talk about 2020 targets it quickly becomes apparent that

a) we are going to miss those targets. By a very very long way. (But it doesn’t matter, because the targets were inadequate, and we’re fucked)

which is bad enough, but

b) the people who are responsible for the missing of those of those 2020 targets are still in the room. Worse, they are probably the very people on whom the HSP relies for the next bit of grant funding, the next reference, the next desired job.

Awkward.

So, what is to be done? Well, if the HSPs had a shred of intellectual prowess, or moral courage, they’d move the goalposts as little as possible, to say 2025.

In Manchester, the new goalpost is… 2050. Obvs; that’s just how the HSPs of MCC, MACF, LCH, etc roll.

So, we’ve got a “major and substantive report, which will address the Council’s commitments on climate change between now and 2050, in light of agreements at the recent Paris talks“ coming to Neighbourhoods Scrutiny Committee in July..

Meanwhile, there is an event on March 2nd

This half-day workshop for arts and cultural organisations will explore what leadership on environmental sustainability looks like amongst the creative community.
The workshop is a partnership between Julie’s Bicycle, Manchester Arts Sustainability Team (MAST) network and the Manchester Climate Change Agency. It will be the official launch of the Manchester Climate Lab – a year of events and engagement activities to develop a five year plan towards achieving the city’s vision for a zero carbon Manchester by 2050.

Will either the report or the event have any serious reflection on the scale and causes of the failure between 2009 and 2016? Don’t go holding your breath…

Cui bono?
The whole 2050 target thing is a total gift (courtesy of those muppets at Avaaz) to local power-brokers who very very occasionally need to deflect (statistically irrelevant) local concern about climate inaction. They are perfectly happy to make some long-term non-binding commitment, especially if it means that their feet are not held to the fire over the broken promises they made a few short years ago. They could not, in fact, be happier.
Meanwhile, those who need to cuddle up to these power-brokers – for financial, political or psychological reasons – are not forced to confront the brutal reality of everyone’s failure over the last ten years (well, almost 30 years if we’re honest with ourselves) to reduce our carbon emissions and start preparing for the unpreparable.

Be happy?
Basically, we should be grateful for this 2050 meme In the same way that certain individuals (hi, TB!) and organisations (hi MACF!), operate as useful warnings-for-those-who-choose-to-hear-them, then the “2050 target” flags up that the people running the event are HSPs.

  • You may or may not have a good time at their event.
  • You may or may not meet some interesting people.
  • You may or may not learn something.

All that depends. One thing is certain though – you’ll be unable to contribute anything meaningful , (for example, um, reality), because the maintenance of Happiness, Shininess and – most of all –the support of our current Lords and Masters – is the number one priority.

The game’s the game.

What a species. I’m glad I’m 45. I’m glad I didn’t have kids. Carpe the diems.

See also
literature on management of expectations
nature of bureaucracy (Peter Principle, Parkinson’s Law, Michel’s Oligarchical Law of Irony)
long-term targets as farcical ‘kick the can down the road’ mechanism

Indicator species.
Canaries in the coal mine
Litmus test
Red flags
Signals passed at danger
Hindsight is a beautiful thing

Anxiety Management
Siggie Freud
Terror Management Theory

 

The “Greenhouse Mafia”, ten years on. #Australia #auspol #climate

Ten years ago today Four Corners broadcast a programme on “the greenhouse mafia”. In hindsight it can be seen as the starting gun for a two year sprint that led to “the first climate change election” It’s worth knowing the history and actions of one of the groups revealed by that documentary.

The first time most Australians will have heard of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network was during a Four Corners documentary in February 2006. That documentary, available here.

It drew in part on the PhD of Guy Pearse. Pearse, then a Liberal Party member and lobbyist, had investigated the stark absence of the tourism, agriculture and industry sectors (among others) from the debates over climate change that took place under the Prime Ministership of John Howard.

Formation of the AIGN 
The mining industry and its ideological supporters had spent the19 70s and 1980s winning battle after battle around deregulation of the economy (this is well covered in a number of books, including Mark Davis’ Land of Plenty). The upsurge of concern in the late 1980s over environmental issues and the resurgence of Aboriginal land rights presented a threat to those then-recent victories. In the space of three years three alarming developments took place – the Hawke government’s “Environmentally Sustainable Development” process, its banning of uranium mining at Coronation Hill, and then the High Court judgement on native title (Mabo). Industry was rattled, and one response was the creation of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network.

Something clearly had to be done, and the AIGN was part of the well-funded response.

The AIGN, a small and publicity-shy group of extremely well-connected ex-Federal bureaucrats, was established with the help of the Business Council of Australia and Australian Mining Industry Council (which re-branded in 1995 after going a bit too far on resistance to land-rights legislation).

According to Pearse (2005: 275)

“the AIGN really became a formalisation of the arrangements that the BCA handled in terms of coordinating greenhouse. And they actually set it up independently [and] the executive director of the AIGN… sat in an office … in the Minerals Council.”

The key to its success was an extremely intimate knowledge of both the policies around climate and energy and also the policy-making process. They knew it so well because until they’d joined the AIGN, they’d mostly been in the positions of the bureaucrats they were now lobbying.

The first serious test of the AIGN’s strength was the defeat of the attempt to introduce a Carbon Tax in 1994-5. This tax proposal was put forward by the late Philip Toyne in response to the fact that even then Australia was missing its ‘return emissions to 1990 levels by 2000’ target. It was swatted aside and a purely voluntary emissions reduction scheme – the “Greenhouse Challenge” – was put forward in its place, with AIGN helping to write the rules.

The next major battle for the AIGN was in helping Australia get the best possible deal at the international negotiations that culminated in the Kyoto Protocol. They certainly weren’t alone in this, and Australia won not just a 108% “reduction” target, but also a clause that gave it credit for reducing its land-clearing from a very high rate to a slightly lower one.

Enforcing (the appearance of) business unity

A key feature of the Howard regime’s climate stance was claiming that business was united in opposition to either domestic emissions trading or ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. There were struggles within the AIGN over this, especially with the Australian Gas Association, which left the group and tried to promote gas as a low-carbon electricity alternative.

More intriguingly was a successful At one point an influential ex-Clinton Administration official, Eileen Claussen, visited Australia in the hope of establishing pro-climate action business grouping.

The AIGN sprang into (subtle) action. Again from Pearse’s PhD-

“and they brought her out to Australia at the Australian Greenhouse Office’s expense and did all this lobbying around Australia trying to set up a version of the Pew Centre here in Australia… BP sponsored it and all that sort of shit. And Dick Wells was basically chairing the AIGN at the stage and he said ‘hey, what is this about? We are not being invited to any of these forums. You are paying for it out of Commonwealth funds. I mean what is the story? Don’t we have this open process?’ In the end, business people who AIGN knew very well and AIGN briefed on these things went along to these meetings anyway and told them that they saw no benefit in it so it fell over.” (Pearse, 2005:353)

Years later WWF and the insurance group IAG launched the “Australian Climate Group”, and in 2006 the Australian Conservation Foundation helped midwife a group that made “the Business Case for Early (sic) Action on Climate Change.”

By 2006, because of the millennium drought, international developments like the establishment of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and Al Gore’s film, climate change moved back onto the agenda. No longer able to defer action the Howard government agreed to investigate emissions trading. The AIGN was well-placed – its then chair, John Eyles, served on the emissions trading taskforce that Howard created.

The (blink and you’d miss it) apogee of its public profile came in early 2011, when, in the midst of the battles against Julia Gillard’s “great big tax on everything” emissions trading scheme, the AIGN co-hosted a business briefing in Canberra with the Business Council of Australia

Since then it has settled back into a comfortable rhythm of regular briefings and meetings for its corporate members, and regular policy interventions to battle support for renewables.

Why haven’t we heard more about these guys? 
With the honourable exceptions of Guy Pearse and Clive Hamilton there has been little extended investigation of the AIGN (a masters thesis was written almost 20 years ago about the carbon tax campaign). There are various reasons for this;

It’s partly because they are not in the business of advertising themselves or drawing attention to themselves. Uninterested in fighting culture wars, and perhaps also wary of the need to maintain its credibility, the AIGN pointedly refused to get involved in the Lavoisier Group.
With characteristic understatement it writes
“rarely issues press releases on matters being debated, it does issue statements to coincide with the release of consultant reports that it has commissioned and which are released to the public.” (from its 2013-14 Annual Report, page 9)

So, without much in public domain, and with interviews either costly or impossible to do, academics will pick on more visible targets. Behind this may lurk the fear of being labelled “conspiracy theorist”, which is one of the main ways academics swear at each other.

The AIGN is not a conspiracy. They didn’t shoot JFK, kidnap or Harold Holt. But they certainly succeeded in their objective of slowing the pace of climate action and defending the (short-term) interests of fossil fuel producers. If in 1992 you had told its funders that almost 25 years later Australia would be without a carbon tax or any other measures that seriously impinge on emissions, they’d have surely broken into prolonged war-whooping and fist-pumping. Well…

Interview with an academic – on “Two Degrees”, Paris, #climate and so on

The Two Degrees Dangerous Limit for Climate Change: Public understanding and decision making” is a (very) new book by academic Chris Shaw. Here he responds to a series of questions about the two degree limit, the recent Paris conference, and ‘what next’. [The book itself is a good ‘un – if anyone in Manchester wants to borrow my copy, contact me through the usual channels.]

Your book was ‘inspired’ by the 2003 heatwave that killed thousands in Europe. And you did your interviews in 2009, before Copenhagen. It’s 2015- what took you so long? Did “Real Life” get in the way? When did you send it to the printers?

The book started as a PhD thesis. It was 2003 that made me doubt the ‘climate change not dangerous until 2c’ narrative. So I had to go away and do the research. It was 2005 when I went back to university to do a masters and then a PhD whilst also being primary carer to two young children. So that was all slow going. Then that was followed by a period of self-doubt, where the idea’s any good etc. Once I realised it was worth publishing then, as you note, the data felt perhaps a little old. So I thought, OK, I will write a whole new book. But by then I was working full time, alongside home and family commitments and I found writing the book a real struggle. But I didn’t want to just re hash what I had done previously. Even though my thesis was passed without correction and described as very literate I still felt I could do better, that my thinking had progressed. But when it came to it, I really struggled to find the time and whilst I could have continued with new research etc I was also keen to get it published by COP 21, with 2C back in the headlines. So in the end it is a mix of new ideas and the interview data from pre – 2009 which is actually timeless, as it is describing how the idea of a dangerous limit to climate change took hold. It went to the printers in the summer.

Who do you hope reads it (and don’t say ‘everyone’!)

Mostly climate change communicators. The debate, such as it is, is characterised by political naivety, that somehow corporate and human agendas can be aligned and that we have a pluralist democracy. I want to challenge that bourgeois complacency. I have seen a shift in the discourse since 2009, it is now sometimes described as a political target or an internationally agreed target rather than something scientists say is dangerous. We need more of that, an acceptance that we don’t know what we are doing, that science hasn’t identified a magic line below which everything is fine. We need to develop a discourse which allows us to make sense of what is happening around us (today in the Telegraph Boris Johnson was writing that the exceptionally warm weather is nothing to do with climate change)

For those who aren’t up on their Kuhn/Lakatos/Popper etc – What do you mean by by 2 degrees being a ‘constructed number’ -if a bunch of scientists agree it, isn’t in then Scientific?

But they don’t agree. It is very clear, science can offer probabilistic projections of future climate impacts but it is not the role of scientists at what point those impacts become unacceptable.

You say that the construction of the two degrees target silenced other voices. At times you imply that was a deliberate silencing. Could you elaborate on that, and on whose voice(s) were silenced

It is a globalised perspective. An abstract statistical construction. Most people in the west have never heard of it, have no idea what it means or the risks it implies. The concept is a complete irrelevance to the vast majority of the world’s population – what does it mean to a subsistence farmer in Asia? The trade-offs involved, the costs of the costs-benefit analysis underlying the 2c claim, will be born by those who have no awareness of the idea. To measure the emissions of the global economy, match those against projections of warming and associated impacts requires laboratories, higher education, a scientistic culture. It has given birth to a way of being populated by salaried professionals. If you aren’t playing that game you have no voice in the ‘debate’. But 2c is also a very broad tent, it can accommodate a range of political perspectives from left and right. As a result any one pissing into the tent from outside can be dismissed as irrational and irrelevant. The only goal any reasonable progressive could aspire to is 2c of warming.

Given how busy we will be just surviving soon, it’s probably a good idea to get a head-start on the ‘post-mortems’ – What went wrong in our species’ response to climate change?

I have always been motivated by a belief in humanity. But the vast majority of humanity have a very different attitude to risk from elites. You know the drill, elites in politics, corporations, sport etc get schooled in the wonders of taking risks, not being timid, going for it etc etc. This elite culture is the one that got to define what sort of problem climate change is and hence what sort of responses are appropriate. Go for 2c, it’s high risk but human ingenuity will find a way to transition to a carbon free neo-liberalism. haven’t we always muddled through? For most people, what they stand to lose in a warming world is not compensated for by the meagre crumbs falling from the rich man’s table. That is why the issue has to be constructed as one beyond political debate – the people would come back with the wrong answer.

On the recent Paris Conference – were you surprised by the inclusion of the 1.5 degrees reference(s)? Why were they in there, in your opinion?

I was surprised, given there is no plan in place for 2c. I assume the intention was to placate marginal voices to help promote Paris as a ‘success’. We don’t want any flies in the ointment. But in the end it doesn’t matter what the number is 1c, 1.5c or 2c, unless the response is rooted in a democratic political contestation of values then all anyone is doing is rubber stamping the corporate agenda.

What is the significance of the developing countries having signed away their “loss and damage” claims?

It is a blow for the climate justice agenda but it seems they had little choice, the rich nations weren’t going to sign up for it. But the relationship between North and South has always been an exploitative one so I can’t see what has happened in global politics to change that relationship. The poor countries were never going to get the money. That’s not how the world works.

Anything else you’d add on Paris?

Well the success is rooted in a final death knell for the idea that responding to climate change will require a fundamental shift in politics, society and economics to a more equal future and a rejection of neo-liberalism. Instead the dominant narrative is that humanity and the planet will be saved by a transformation of the energy system. Neo-liberalism without the emissions.

Gazing into your crystal ball, what do you see for ‘us’ and ‘others’ as the world powers towards (and beyond) two degrees of warming, where ‘us’ means

a) climate-oriented academics – I do not see how the ‘system’ can survive 2c plus of warming and sustain a thriving and open academic culture. Even if economic and agricultural systems remained intact I think our days (people like you and me) are numbered. Shut up, play the game and help usher in the energy transformation. There will not be a living to be made from challenging the status quo.

b) privileged white citizens of (currently) prosperous countries – as above really. I don’t think we have a handle on just how severe the impacts of 2c warming will be. Mark Lynas wrote that under 2c of warming every summer in Europe will be like 2003. I don’t think Europe could take many consecutive summers like that.

c) and where ‘others’ means the poor in the Majority World. Well, the Inuit culture is almost finished now as a result of melting ice. I would hate to proclaim what will happen to the Majority World, but I fancy their chances better than ours – we couldn’t even survive 24 hours without youtube.

Anything else – other than ‘buy my book’ – that you want to add?

Maybe don’t buy the book as it is priced for the closed market of academia. I have a website in development, www.dangerouslimits.org.www.dangerouslimits.org. Maybe visit there in 6 months when I have found the time to update the content, to see what is happening in the sorry world of global climate governance.